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Commentators have increasingly converged in their accounts of the literary strategy of 
Areopagitica; A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Vnlicenc’d Printing, To 
the Parlament of England (November 1644).   Its potency, they agree, stems from 
Milton’s constant disruption of his own lines of argument, his own sequences of 
images, and his own rhetorical forms (see Fish 1988; Cable 1995: 117-43; Norbrook 
1999: 118-39).  But at the same time they have increasingly diverged in their accounts 
of the tract’s ideological identity to the extent that it is now cited in support of flatly 
opposed positions.  Thus a recent textbook on Free Speech claims that John Stuart 
Mill’s argument in On Liberty (1859) merely ‘follows the broad outlines’ of 
Areopagitica, as demonstrated by a series of parallel extracts (Haworth 1998: 120, 
224-8; see also Cable 1995: 129-35). By contrast, Stanley Fish maintains that Milton 
‘has almost no interest at all in the “freedom of the press”’ and even that he ‘does not 
unambiguously value freedom at all’ (Fish 1988: 235).  Milton’s alleged denial of free 
speech then becomes the springboard for the yet more startling proposition that 
“There’s no such thing as free speech, and it’s a good thing, too” (Fish 1994: 102-19).  
The reason for this lack of consensus is that Areopagitica, widely regarded as one of 
the constitutive texts of modern liberalism, has become a contested site in a larger 
dispute about liberal values.  This essay outlines the more controversial features of the 




Half way through Areopagitica, Milton changes the angle of his attack on the 
Licensing Order of June 1643 from ‘the no good it can do, to the manifest hurt it 
causes’ (Milton 1953-82, 2: 530; edition henceforth cited by volume and page 
number).  He focuses on the figure of the licenser, without whose prior consent, 
according to the Order, no ‘Book, Pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be 
printed, bound, stitched or put to sale’ (2:797).  However, Milton complains, 





 I know nothing of the licencer but that I have his own hand here for his 
 arrogance; who shall warrant me his judgement?  The State Sir, replies the 
 Stationer, but has a quick return, The State shall be my governours, but not my 
 criticks (2:533-34). 
 
Milton sometimes refers to critics and criticism in the narrow sense, as when he 
scorns ‘the worme of Criticisme’ in one pedantic opponent, or mocks Eikon Basilike 
for the ‘petty glosses and conceits’ yielded by its ‘criticism’ of divine judgements (1: 
916-17; 3: 430).  But here Milton is not thinking of critics as commentators upon what 
is written but as those who choose what is to be read.  They are like the connoisseurs 
of sin who scan ‘heathen Writers’ on behalf of others and  
 
 instill the poison they suck, first into the Courts of Princes, acquainting them 
 with the choisest delights, and criticisms of sin.  As perhaps did that Petronius  
 whom Nero call’d his Arbiter, the Master of his revels; and that notorious 
 ribald of Arezzo, dreaded, and yet dear to the Italian Courtiers. (2: 518) 
 
The message of Milton’s epigrammatic ‘return’ to the stationer is thus that those who 
govern the state will be exceeding their powers if they arrogate to themselves choices 
‘wherein every mature man might … exercise his own leading capacity’ (2: 513). 
 Nevertheless, this attempt to differentiate between governors and critics may 
appear little better than a verbal sleight of hand.  After all, what are our governors for 
if not to make choices on our behalf?  The difficulty deepens when we recall a 
passage near the start of Areopagitica: 
 
 I deny not, but that it is of greatest concernment in the Church and 
 Commonwealth, to have a vigilant eye how Bookes demeane themselves, as 
 well as men; and thereafter to confine, imprison, and do sharpest justice on 
 them as malefactors… (2: 492) 
 
So books as such are not beyond the scope of state surveillance, in which case Milton 
appears to be asserting simultaneously that the state can and cannot interfere with 




them, arousing suspicion in turn that the distinction between governors and critics is 
merely a form of words devised to cover his confusion.   
  More notorious still is the passage in the peroration that affirms the principle 
of toleration only to modulate into something harsher: 
 
 if all cannot be of one mind, as who looks they should be? this doubtles is 
 more wholsome, more prudent, and more Christian that many be tolerated, 
 rather then all compell’d.  I mean not tolerated Popery, and open superstition, 
 which as it extirpats all religions and civill supremacies, so it self should be 
 extirpat, provided first that all charitable and compassionat means be us’d to 
 win and regain the weak and the misled…(2: 565) 
 
It might be pleaded that Milton is one of many seventeenth-century figures, like John 
Locke, who argued for toleration but excluded Roman Catholics (see now Coffey 
1998).  Furthermore, Milton’s expressions appear no more violent than those of Roger 
Williams, who famously did extend toleration to Catholics in his Bloudy Tenent of 
Persecution (1644).  For while Williams thinks they should be tolerated, this does not 
mean, as we might expect, that they are ‘to be let alone’.  On the contrary, such 
‘Antichristian idolaters’ ought to be ‘spiritually stoned to death’ (Woodhouse 1974: 
269-70).  Even so, there seems no escaping the fact that Milton floats a distinction 
between governors and critics that he either forgets or disregards. 
 This crux has become a standard feature of commentaries.  David Masson set 
the pattern when he memorably remarked that Areopagitica was a work which ‘bites 
into modern interests and the constitution of the modern intellect’ – despite the fact 
that ‘in his theory of Toleration, Milton was decidedly behind some of his 
contemporaries’ (Masson 1859-94, 4: 288, 302).  Likewise, for Catherine Belsey, 
Areopagitica is ‘one of the founding and canonical texts of modern liberalism’ – even 
though it offers a ‘rather authoritarian version of liberalism’ (Belsey 1988: 77-8).  As 
‘Milton’s most inarguably liberal pamphlet’, it looms large in Annabel Patterson’s 
account of Early Modern Liberalism – notwithstanding ‘the exceptions he granted to 
the ideal of toleration’ (Patterson 1997: 23, 64).  Similarly, for Barbara Lewalski its 
arguments ‘have become a cornerstone in the liberal defense of freedom of speech, 
press and thought’ – albeit ‘critics have properly taken note’ of their qualified nature 
(Lewalski 1998: 64).  They all insist, that is, on the integrity of Milton’s professions 




of liberal principle while acknowledging that there are exceptions at odds with what 
he professes – and leave it at that, tacitly conceding that Areopagitica ‘lacks 
conceptual coherence’ (though, according to Thomas Corns, it is not unique in this 
respect since it is always a mistake ‘to look for philosophical coherence in Milton’s 
controversial prose’) (Dobranski 1998: 146; Corns 1992: 56). 
 Others, however, foreground the exceptions in the hope of exposing the 
emptiness of Milton’s professions.  Fish welcomes the ‘tensions and discontinuities’ 
precisely because they disrupt what is otherwise taken for ‘the steady unfolding of a 
classic liberal vision’ (Fish 1988: 248). Willmoore Kendall argues that we will have 
‘learned to read the Areopagitica only when we can read this passage [about popery] 
and not find in it any inconsistency’.  What we must realize is that Areopagatica, 
despite its ‘intoxicating rhetoric’ of freedom, actually belongs to ‘a realm of discourse 
entirely different from Mill’s’ and that  ‘its rightful place’ is ‘among the political 
treatises we have all been brought up to deplore’ which oppose freedom of thought 
and speech (Kendall 1960: 440, 446, 453, 461n).  For John Illo too the ‘torrential 
majesty of Milton’s prose’ and ‘the grand libertarian generalities’ impede our 
understanding of Areopagitica, which has consistently been read – or rather misread – 
as if it were the work ‘of a Jefferson, not of a Robespierre’, whereas the truth is that it 
was ‘not liberal or libertarian even in its own time, but a militant and exclusivist 
revolutionary pamphlet’ (Illo 1972: 186, 187, 189). 
 These commentators in short offer a choice between, on the one hand, a tract 
that is liberal but conceptually incoherent and, on the other, one whose rhetoric of 
freedom is disconnected from its actually illiberal tendencies.  But whichever version 




My aim is to pick a different route through these issues, guided by the recent work of 
Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner on the “republican” (or, as Skinner prefers to term 
it, “neo-roman”) theory of freedom which challenges the view of liberty, dominant 
since the late eighteenth century, as something to be understood purely negatively in 
terms of the absence of interference or coercion. As Isaiah Berlin, the most influential 
recent spokesman for the negative concept, puts it, ‘being free’ is a matter of ‘not 
being interfered with by others.  The wider the area of non-interference the wider my 




freedom’.  Liberty is the space within which we are not answerable to others, and, for 
the purpose of maximizing this space, what matters is not by whom but how much we 
are governed.  Berlin’s survey of the extent to which various regimes interfere with us 
leads him to conclude that liberty ‘is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, 
or at any rate with the absence of self-government’ since ‘it is perfectly conceivable 
that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of personal 
freedom’.  This is, moreover, not some hypothesis entertained for the sake of 
argument but a description of the near-ideal state of affairs that existed in eighteenth-
century Prussia or Austria (Berlin 1969: 123, 129 and note). 
 In undoing this knot of liberal beliefs, Pettit and Skinner appeal to several 
early modern writers – including Milton – who represent a rival tradition of thinking 
about liberty.  Three of the arguments singled out from this tradition are especially 
relevant to Areopagitica.  The first is that while the theorists of negative liberty are 
right in claiming that our liberty will be diminished to the extent that we are interfered 
with or coerced, this is not the only way in which we can become unfree.  We also 
forfeit our liberty whenever we find ourselves dependent on the good will of others 
for the continued enjoyment of our rights. For even if we are, as it happens, subject to 
a liberal-minded despot who allows us a large measure of personal freedom, we 
nevertheless have to live with, and will be constrained in our behaviour by, the danger 
that this measure of freedom can be taken away at any time.  As Skinner remarks,  ‘it 
is the mere possibility of your being subjected with impunity to arbitrary coercion, not 
the fact of your being coerced, that takes away your liberty and reduces you to the 
condition of a slave’ (Skinner 1998: 72).  Accordingly, we can now see that the reason 
why Milton objects so strongly to the system of pre-publication censorship is that it 
leaves the author’s freedom to publish wholly at the discretion of the licenser.  How 
that discretion happens to be exercised is beside the point.  While it is of course 
deplorable if your work is interfered with, you are no better off if your licenser turns 
out to be liberal-minded and declines to change one iota of your text because the fact 
that you are dependent on the will of others, even if they show no inclination at 
present to exert their powers and may never do so, is enough in and of itself to render 
you unfree. 
 Milton’s convictions on the topic of freedom and unfreedom were shaped by 
his reading of Roman law in the early 1640s.  The Commonplace book has several 
entries from Justinian’s Institutes on ‘what lawyers declare concerning liberty and 




slavery’ (1: 470).  Just as in the Roman law of persons children and slaves are unfree 
by virtue of being subject to the will of others (see Skinner 1998: 40-41), so, 
according to Milton in Areopagitica, to be required to conform to the Licensing Order 
is to be treated as a child or slave without a will of your own and, in consequence, to 
be unfree.  Even though God did not intend man to be ‘captivat under a perpetuall 
childhood of prescription’, Milton observes, those in favour of licensing do not ‘count 
him fit to print his mind without a tutor and examiner’ (2: 514, 531).  But in this case,      
 
 What advantage is it to be a man over it is t be a boy at school, if we have only 
 scapt the ferular, to come under the fescu of an Imprimatur? if serious and 
 elaborat writings, as if they were no more then the theam of a Grammar lad 
 under his Pedagogue must not be utter’d without the cursory eyes of a 
 temporizing and extemporizing licenser. (2: 531) 
 
The author is forced to ‘appear in Print like a punie with his guardian’.  Nor can any 
serious reader respect writings produced ‘under the tuition, under the correction of his 
patriarchal licencer’ or published ‘under the wardship of an overseeing fist’.  What the 
Licensing Order systematically brings about therefore is the infantilization of the 
author, leaving him in a condition of legal disability which is nothing short of 
‘servitude like that impos’d by the Philistims’, an ‘undeserved thraldom upon 
learning’ and a ‘second tyranny over’ it (2: 532, 533, 536, 539). 
 The second of the arguments highlighted by Pettit and Skinner concerns law 
and coercion.  This is a topic that those for whom liberty is nothing other than non-
interference can exhaust in a few equations.  Since all laws are coercive, and since 
freedom consists in the absence of coercion, freedom is that space upon which the 
laws have not encroached.  And since empty space is empty space wherever you are, 
the liberty of the subject will not vary from regime to regime, as Hobbes famously 
insisted: ‘Whether a Common-Wealth be Monarchical, or Popular, the Freedome is 
still the same’ (Hobbes 1996: 149).  The reply to Hobbes, as to Berlin earlier, is that 
in order to remain free it is not enough to avoid being coerced; we must also avoid 
being dominated by those with arbitrary (even if unexercised) powers.  However, this 
is not quite the last word for, according to Pettit, just as there can be domination 
without interference (as in the case of the liberal-minded despot), so there can be 
interference without domination.  This is because domination and interference are 




‘different evils’; whereas the former ‘requires only that someone have the capacity to 
interfere arbitrarily’, the latter ‘need not involve the exercise of a capacity for 
arbitrary interference, only the exercise of a much more constrained ability’.  The 
upshot is that ‘you can be interfered with by some agency, as in the case of subjection 
to a suitable form of law and government, without being dominated by anyone’ (Pettit 
1997: 23, 80). 
 This view of state interference as a relatively benign phenomenon helps to 
make sense of Milton’s insistence that the state is properly concerned with ‘how 
bookes demeane themselves’.  All the forms of state coercion that Milton is prepared 
to countenance in fact involve the due process of law and are therefore non-arbitrary.  
The point of keeping ‘a vigilant eye’ on books after they have been published is to do 
‘justice on them as malefactors’.  Anyone who publishes their work freely does so 
‘standing to the hazard of law and penalty’ Milton (2: 492, 531).  And when it comes 
to ‘regulating the Press’, the most Milton will endorse is the minimal Order of January 
1642 which, he reports, required  
 
 that no book be Printed, unlesse the Printers and the Authors name, or at least 
 the Printers be register’d.  Those which otherwise come forth, if they be found 
 mischievous and libellous, the fire and the executioner will be the timeliest 
 and most effectuall remedy… (2: 569)  
 
While this sounds draconian, no book would be burnt unless guilty of infractions of 
the 1642 Order and of the existing laws of sedition and libel.  As Pettit remarks, 
‘provided that it is not arbitrary, state interference will not count as a serious loss – as 
a way of compromising liberty – in the republican’s book’ (Pettit 1997: 76n).  And 
nor does it in Milton’s. 
 The third and final aspect of the republican or neo-roman tradition is statecraft 
in the literal sense of shaping the state around ideals and values.  Here Pettit outlines 
two possible strategies; the ‘first is that the value or good or ideal should serve as a 
goal for the state to promote, the second that it should serve as a constraint on how the 
state is to pursue other goals’ (Pettit 1997: 97).  So if a state values peace and wishes 
to promote it, then there are times when the pursuit of this objective may entail going 
to war.  But if peace serves as a constraint, then the state will honour this by behaving 




peaceably in all its dealings, and will avoid war, even – or especially – war waged in 
the name of peace. 
 The classic text in which these statebuilding strategies are played out in 
tandem is More’s Utopia.  Treating values as constraints to which every part of 
utopian society must bear witness is what generates much of the fascinating detail in 
the description of the utopian commonwealth.  At times, however, the utopians adopt 
a consequentialist attitude, promoting their values by whatever means are necessary.  
Thus they despise war but are ruthless military tacticians.  Such paradoxes are, 
however, a regular feature of the republican tradition.  For Machiavelli, freedom is a 
goal, not a constraint, and, rather than allow citizens who have become corrupt to lose 
their liberty, he takes the strongly consequentialist line that they must be forced to be 
free by being coerced into virtue (see Skinner 1993: 304-6).  And, on the eve of the 
Restoration, it is the line Milton takes in The Readie and Easie Way when arguing that 
it is ‘just’ for ‘a less number [to] compell a greater to retain, which can be no wrong to 
them, thir libertie’ (7: 455).  This has been deplored as ‘a terrible argument’ (7: 212), 
but it has some claim to be regarded as one of the most characteristically republican 
utterances in Milton’s most republican treatise. 
 The distinction between goals and constraints helps to explain the charges of 
conceptual incoherence levelled against Areopagitica.  For what these assume is that 
the freedom of speech features in Milton’s account of the public sphere not as a goal 
which the state is to promote but as a constraint by which the state is bound in all its 
dealings.  On this view, nothing that the state does should derogate from, or fail to 
bear witness to, the ideal of freedom of speech.  So when Milton endorses 
prosecutions for sedition and libel or condones book burning he has evidently 
forgotten the premise on which his argument is (supposedly) based.  But not only he 
does he show no interest in fetishizing freedom of speech, as these commentators 
require, he also goes out of his way to dismiss statebuilding exercises as such.  Plato 
merely ‘fed his fancie with making many edicts to his ayrie Burgomasters’ while ‘To 
sequester out of the world into Atlantick and Eutopian polities, which never can be 
drawn into use, will not mend our condition’ (2: 522, 526).  The hostility to mere 
paper consistency is all of a piece with his consequentialist attitude to the freedom of 
speech, which the state should promote by whatever means, even if, on occasion, this 
means suppressing speech (a similar argument applies to the denial of liberty of 
conscience to Catholics). 




 My conclusion is that many of our current difficulties with Areopagitica are 
self-created.  They arise from a propensity to assess Milton’s text in terms of 
inappropriate, because anachronistic, categories and concepts.  One such is negative 
liberty when, as far as I can see, it is impossible to produce a consistent reading of 
Areopagitica solely in terms of the concept, at least as Hobbes or Mill or Berlin 
understood it.  The republican or neo-roman theory of freedom appears to do much 
better by the work, above all in effecting a reconciliation between Milton’s rhetoric of 
freedom and the degree of state coercion that he countenances.  The slogan 
‘interference without domination’ seems a fair modern rendition of ‘The State shall be 
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